We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with di¤erentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which one will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each …rm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost …rm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988) , allow the conclusion that only the high cost …rm will choose to wait. Hence, the low cost …rm will emerge as the endogenous price leader. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: C72, D43.
Introduction
Standard game theoretic models of oligopoly situations impose the order of the moves exogenously, an assumption that was already criticized in Von Stackelberg (1934) , well before game theory invaded the …eld of industrial organization. Von Stackelberg pointed out that players have preferences over which role (leader or follower) to play in the game and he argued that a stable equilibrium would result only if the actual role assignment would be consistent with these preferences. As Von Stackelberg argued, in many situations both duopolists prefer the same role so that a stable situation does not appear to exist.
In the case of quantity competition, the typical situation is that the position of leader is most preferred and that the follower's position is least desirable, with simultaneous moves resulting in intermediate payo¤s. Hence, in this situation a …ght -a Stackelberg war -might arise as to which of the players will assume the leadership role. In an earlier paper in this journal (Van Damme and Hurkens, 1999) we addressed the question of which player will succeed in obtaining this most privileged position. We focused on the case of homogeneous products with linear demand and constant marginal cost, with one …rm being a more e¢cient producer than the other. Using an endogeneous timing game introduced in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) , we showed that committing to move early is more risky for the high cost …rm, hence, that risk dominance considerations (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) imply that the e¢cient …rm will take up the leadership position.
In the present paper we address the same question in the context of price competition in a duopoly with di¤erentiated substitutable products, linear and symmetric demand, and constant marginal cost. Again we assume that one …rm is more e¢cient than the other and has lower marginal cost. The question is whether also in this case the more e¢cient …rm will emerge as the leader in the game.
Price competition, however, is fundamentally di¤erent from quantity competition in that the leadership role now is not the most preferred one. While it is indeed true that, under general conditions, a price duopolist prefers to move …rst to moving simultaneously, a player can bene…t even more if he can move last. (See Boyer and Moreaux, 1987; Dowrick, 1986; and Gal-Or, 1985) . The basic intuition can be easily seen when …rms are identical. First of all one notices that the price of the leader p L is larger than the Nash equilibrium price p N since the leader's total pro…t, taking into account the rival's optimal reaction, is increasing in his price at the Nash equilibrium. Since the follower's reaction curve is ‡atter than the 45 degree line, the follower's price p F is smaller than
(The …rst inequality follows since p F is on the follower's reaction curve, the second since the leader pro…ts from a higher price of the follower, and the last since the leader could have chosen p N instead of p L .) Hence, if …rms are identical, each …rm prefers following above leading, while any sequential order is preferred above moving simultaneously.
By continuity, these preferences remain when di¤erences between the …rms are not too large. 1 As in our earlier paper, we use the "action commitment" model from Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) to determine which player will get which role. The model allows …rms to choose a price either early or late; choices within a period are simultaneous, but if one …rm moves early and the other moves late, the latter is informed about the former's price before making its choice. Since following confers advantages, it follows that the game has two pure equilibria corresponding to the two possible sequential orderings of the moves, with players having opposite preferences about these equilibria. In our view, the question of who will take up the most preferred role amounts to solving the problem of which player is willing to take the largest risk in waiting and we formally answer this question by using the risk-dominance concept from Harsanyi and Selten (1988) .
The surprising conclusion is that waiting is more risky for the low cost …rm, hence, the e¢cient …rm will emerge as the price leader and the less e¢cient …rm will take up the more favorable follower role. Relating this result to our earlier paper, we see that the identity of the leader is independent of whether prices or quantities are the strategic variables.
The basic intuition for our main result derives from the fact that the high cost …rm has more to gain from moving last. As each …rm prefers to follow, it is natural to assume that each player initially expects the other to hold out. Players cannot maintain these expectations, however, as both players holding out is not a Nash equilibrium. Hence, each player is forced to adjust his expectations and he will represent his uncertainty by a mixed strategy that assigns some weight to the opponent committing to a (possibly random) price and that puts the complementary weight on the opponent waiting. As the high cost …rm gains more from waiting, it is more insisting on this position. To put it di¤erently, as long as the low cost …rm …nds it attractive to wait, the high cost …rm …nds this attractive as well. Hence, given that one …rm has to give in, this will be the low cost …rm. The high cost …rm will thus obtain the most preferred position.
Our paper thus provides a game theoretic justi…cation for price leadership by the e¢cient or dominant …rm. The traditional industrial organization literature has emphasized price leadership in general and leadership by the dominant …rm in particular. It argues that leadership allows …rms to better coordinate their prices and that it results in higher prices and lower consumer surplus, thus raising possible antitrust concerns. However, that literature is not so clear on which …rm will take up the leadership role. For example, Markham (1951) in his seminal paper concluded on the one hand that "... price 'leadership' in a dominant …rm market is not simply a modus operandi designed to circumvent price competition among rival sellers but is instead an inevitable consequence of the industry's structure," while on the other hand he stated that "... in a large number of industries which do not contain a partial monopolist, the price leader is frequently but not always the largest …rm." Similarly, Scherer and Ross (1990) list as distinguishing characteristics of (barometric) price leadership "... occasional changes in the identity of the price leader (who is likely in any case to be one of the largest sellers)." We believe that the risk considerations that we stress in our paper might shed some light on these issues of price leadership in practice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The underlying duopoly game as well as the action commitment game from Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) are described in Section 2, where also the relevant notation is introduced. Section 3 describes the speci…cs of the risk dominance concept (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) as it applies to this context.
The main results are derived in Section 4. Section 5 shows that a shortcut, based on risk-dominance in the restricted game where each player can only choose between committing to his leader price and waiting, would have given the wrong result, and argues that this is because the restricted game does not provide a faithful description of the actual risks involved. Section 6 o¤ers a brief conclusion.
The Model
The underlying linear price setting duopoly game is as follows. There are two …rms, 1 and 2. Firm i produces product i at a constant marginal cost c i¸0 . The goods are imperfect substitutes and the demand for good i is given by
where 0 < a < 1. Firms choose prices simultaneously and the pro…t of …rm i is given by u i (p i ; p j ) = (p i ¡ c i )D i (p i ; p j ). We assume that 1 > c 1 > c 2 > 0, hence …rm 2 is more e¢cient than …rm 1. The best reply of player j against the price p i of player i is unique and is given by
The unique maximizer of the function p i 7 ! u i (p i ; b j (p i )) is denoted by p L i (…rm i's leader price). We also write p F j for the price that j will choose as a price follower,
for the unique Nash equilibrium of the game and denote player i's payo¤ in this equilibrium by N i .
For later reference we note that
and
One easily veri…es that p L 1 > p L 2 and p F 1 > p F 2 . It also readily follows that
Hence, each player has an incentive to commit himself (compared to the simultaneous play equilibrium) but prefers to follow. Straightforward computations show that F 1 ¡ L 1 > F 2 ¡ L 2 , hence the high cost …rm bene…ts more from being the follower than the low cost …rm. Obviously, the above inequality is equivalent to L 2 + F 1 > L 1 + F 2 , hence total pro…ts are larger when the e¢cient …rm leads. The question we address in this paper is whether the players will succeed in reaching that "e¢cient" ordering of the moves.
To investigate which player will dare to wait when both players have the opportunity to do so, we make use of the two-period action commitment game that was proposed in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) . The rules are as follows. There are two periods and each player has to choose a price in exactly one of these periods. Within a period, choices are simultaneous, but, if a player does not choose to move in period 1, then in period 2 this player is informed about which action his opponent chose in period 1. This game has proper subgames at t = 2 and our assumptions imply that all of these have unique equilibria. We will analyze the reduced game, g 2 , that results when these subgames are replaced by their equilibrium values. Formally, the strategy set of player i in g 2 is R + [ fw i g and the payo¤ function is given by
Note that u i is strictly concave in p i . It is easily seen that g 2 has three Nash equilibria in pure strategies: Either each player i commits to his Nash price p N i in the …rst period, or one player i commits to his leader price p L i and the other player waits till the second period. Mixed equilibria will not be considered 2 , but mixed strategies will play an important role. They represent uncertainty about whether a player will commit himself and to which price. Let m j be a mixed strategy of player j in the game g 2 . Because of the linear-quadratic speci…cation of the game, there are only three "characteristics" of m j that are relevant to player i, viz. w j the probability that player j waits, ¹ j the average price to which j commits himself given that he commits, and º j , the variance of this price. Speci…cally, it easily follows from (2.4)-(2.7) that the expected payo¤ of player i against a mixed strategy m j with characteristics (w j ; ¹ j ; º j ) is given by
Note that (2.8) and (2.9) show that uncertainty concerning the price to which j will commit himself makes it more attractive for player i to wait: º j contributes positively to (2.9) and it does not play a role in (2.8) . On the other hand, increasing w j clearly increases the incentive for player i to commit himself. Finally, increasing ¹ j increases the incentive for player i to commit himself, because of the positive e¤ect on i's demand.
Risk Dominance and the Tracing Procedure
The concept of risk dominance captures the intuitive idea that, when players do not know which of two equilibria should be played, they will measure the risk involved in playing each of these equilibria and they will coordinate expectations on the less risky one, i.e. on the risk dominant equilibrium of the pair. The formal de…nition of risk dominance involves the bicentric prior and the tracing procedure. The bicentric prior describes the players' initial assessment about the situation. If this initial assessment is not an equilibrium of the game, it cannot constitute the players' …nal view and the players have to adjust their plans and expectations until they are in equilibrium. The tracing procedure is a formal model of this adjustment process; it models the thought process of players who, by deductive personal re ‡ection, try to …gure out what to do in this situation. Below we describe the mechanics of the tracing procedure as well as how, according to Harsanyi and Selten (1988) , the initial prior should be constructed.
Bicentric Prior
Let g = (S 1 ; S 2 ; u 1 ; u 2 ) be a 2-person game and let s and s 0 be two equilibria of this game. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) argue that when players are uncertain about which of these two equilibria should be played, their initial beliefs should be constructed as follows. Player j, being Bayesian, will assign a subjective probability z j to i playing s i and he will assign the complementary probability z 0 j = 1 ¡ z j to i playing s 0 i . With these beliefs, player j will play the best response against the mixed strategy z j s i + z 0 j s 0 i of player i, which we denote by b j (z j ). 3 Player j, knowing his prior z j , knows which action he will play. Player i, however, does not know z j exactly and, therefore, cannot predict exactly what j will do. Applying the principle of insu¢cient reason, Harsanyi and Selten (1988) argue that i will consider z j to be uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. Writing Z j for a uniformly distributed random variable on [0; 1], player i will, therefore, believe that he is facing the mixed strategy
and this mixed strategy m j of player j is player i's prior belief about j's behavior in the situation at hand. Similarly,
where Z 1 and Z 2 are independent, is the prior belief of player j , and the mixed strategy pair m = (m 1 ; m 2 ) is called the bicentric prior associated with the pair (s; s 0 ).
Tracing Procedure
Mathematically, the tracing procedure is a map converting initial beliefs into equilibria of the game. Let m i be a mixed strategy of player i in g (i = 1; 2). The strategy m i represents the initial uncertainty of player j about i's behavior. For t 2 [0; 1] we de…ne the game g t;m = (S 1 ; S 2 ; u t;m 1 ; u t;m 2 ) in which the payo¤ functions are given by
Hence, for t = 1, this game g t;m coincides with the original game g, while for t = 0 we have a trivial game in which each player's payo¤ depends only on his own action and his own prior beliefs. 4 Write ¡ m for the graph of the equilibrium correspondence, i.e. by m and if players' reasoning process corresponds to that as modeled by the tracing procedure, then players' expectations will converge on the equilibrium s 1;m of g. Below,
we will apply the tracing procedure to the in…nite game g 2 that was described in the previous section. For such games, no generalizations of the Schanuel et al. (1991) results have been established yet, but as we will see in the following section, there indeed exists a unique distinguished curve in the special case analyzed here. Hence, the non-…niteness of the game g 2 will create no special problems.
Risk Dominance
Risk dominance is de…ned as follows. Consider two equilibria, s and s 0 of g. dominates the other. Below we show that the latter situation will not occur in our 2-stage action commitment game, provided that the costs of the …rms are di¤erent.
Commitment and Risk Dominance
In this section, we prove our main results. Let g 2 be the endogenous commitment game from Section 2. Write S i for the pure equilibrium in which player i commits to his leader price in period 1, S i = (p L i ; w j ), and write B for the equilibrium in which each player commits to his Bertrand price in period 1, B = (p N 1 ; p N 2 ). We show that both price leader equilibria risk dominate the Bertrand equilibrium and that S 2 risk dominates S 1 when c 2 < c 1 . The …rst result is quite intuitive: Committing to p N i is a weakly dominated strategy and playing a weakly dominated strategy is risky. The proof of this result is correspondingly easy and can be found in Appendix A1.
Proposition 1 In g 2 , the price leader equilibrium S i risk dominates the Nash equilibrium B (i = 1; 2).
We now turn to the risk comparison of the two price leader equilibria. We …rst show that, when confronted with the problem to coordinate on S 1 or S 2 , each player's prior belief is that the other player will commit to a random price. Let player j believe that i commits to p L i with probability z and that i waits with probability 1 ¡ z. Waiting yields
Since the mapping p 7 ! u j (p; b i (p)) is concave and attains its maximum at p L j , and since
Therefore, committing to p F j yields higher payo¤ than waiting, and it follows that each player will believe that the opponent will commit with probability 1. To determine the price that j will commit to, note that committing to price p j yields
Given z, the optimal commitment price p j (z) of player j must satisfy the …rst order condition @u j (p j ; zp L i + (1 ¡ z)w i )=@p j = 0, and is, hence, given by
Note that p 1 (z) > p 2 (z) for all z 2 [0; 1], since p L 1 > p L 2 and p F 1 > p F 2 . This means that …rm 1 expects …rm 2 to commit to a low price, while …rm 2 expects …rm 1 to commit to a high price. From
Hence, …rm 2's price is expected to vary more than …rm 1's price. (See Appendix A2 for a formal proof.) We summarize these results in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Player i's bicentric prior m j is that j will commit to a random price p j (z) with expectation ¹ j and variance º j , where ¹ j 2 ¡ p F j ; p L j ¢ and º j > 0. Moreover, we have ¹ 1 > ¹ 2 and º 1 < º 2 .
Now, let us turn to the tracing procedure. The starting point (the initial equilibrium) corresponds to the best reply against the prior. Since both players expect the other to commit with probability one and are uncertain about this committed price, the unique best reply for both players is to wait. As t increases, player i attaches more and more weight (namely t) to the event that player j will wait. At some critical point ¹ t i it must become pro…table to commit and take the leader role. Lemma 1 and the equations (2.8) and (2.9) provide the intuition that the low cost …rm will switch before the high cost …rm will, i.e. that ¹ t 1 > ¹ t 2 : since player 1 (the high cost …rm) commits to a higher and less variable price, it is relatively more attractive for …rm 2 to commit to a price. We elaborate below and relegate the formal proof to Appendix A3.
Recall from Section 2 that the expected payo¤ of player i depends only on his action and the three important characteristics of the opponent's (mixed) strategy, viz. the probability that the other player waits, the average price of the opponent if he commits, and the variance of that price. As long as no player switches away from waiting the tracing procedure will adjust only the probability that the other waits: the average commitment price and the variation of this price do not change. Hence, the expectation of player i at time t, given that no one has switched yet, is given by the mixed strategy m t j = (1 ¡ t)m j + tw j . Identifying this mixed strategy with its important characteristics, write m t j = (t; ¹ j ; º j ). The expected payo¤ for player i from committing and waiting is given in (2.8) and (2.9), respectively. For m t = (t; ¹; º) de…ne the gain from committing for i as
We will show that …rm 2 always has a higher incentive to commit himself than …rm 1, i.e. that g 2 (m t 1 ) > g 1 (m t 2 ) for all t. Since the gain of committing is negative at t = 0 and positive at t = 1, this implies that …rm 2 will switch before …rm 1 does.
The formal proof is divided into three steps and is given in Appendix A3. We now provide intuition for each step. In the …rst step we show that the gain from committing is increasing in the opponent's price. From equations (2.4) and (2.6) it follows in a straightforward manner that
i.e. the marginal e¤ect on i's pro…t of an increase in j's price is equal to the price-cost margin multiplied with the marginal increase in demand. Since j will never commit to a price above p L j , b i (p j ) < p F i . On the other hand, if …rm i commits himself he will (optimally) commit to a price above p F i . The e¤ect of an increase in p j is thus larger when i commits himself than when he waits.
Secondly, the gain from committing is decreasing in the variability of the price of the opponent. This is very intuitive. We know from Lemma 1 that º 1 < º 2 so that …rm 1 is more uncertain about the price …rm 2 will commit himself to. Clearly, this gives him more reason to wait and less to commit.
Finally, we show that the low cost …rm has more incentive to commit than a high cost …rm even if they have exactly the same expectation about the commitment price of the opponent. This follows from the fact that the high cost …rm gains more from being the follower than the low cost …rm, i.e. that F 1 ¡ L 1 > F 2 ¡ L 2 . The above steps can now be combined to show that, with ¹ k and º k as in Lemma 1 we get
The above inequalities imply that at any point in the tracing procedure player 2 gains more from committing than …rm 1, and, therefore, it must be player 2 who will decide to switch …rst, i.e. ¹ t 1 > ¹ t 2 . Thus, both players wait till ¹ t 2 at which point player 2 is exactly indi¤erent between waiting and committing optimally (top 2 ( ¹ t 2 ) ). The graph of the equilibrium correspondence exhibits a "vertical" segment at t 2 . Any pair of strategies in which …rm 1 waits and …rm 2 mixes between waiting (with probability w) and committing top 2 ( ¹ t 2 ) (with probability 1 ¡ w) is an equilibrium of g ¹ t2;m : Firm 2 is indi¤erent and any mixture is therefore a best reply. Firm 1 strictly prefers to wait
1 ) = 0) and also when w = 0 (since then …rm 2 commits for sure to a random price). Because of linearity (in w) …rm 1 prefers to wait for any w 2 [0; 1]. From ¹ t 2 onward, player 2 commits with probability 1 (but changes the commitment price continuously) and player 2 waits with probability 1. Therefore, the tracing procedure ends up in an equilibrium where player 2 commits and player 1 waits, i.e. at S 2 . This concludes the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2
The price leader equilibrium S 2 in which the low cost …rm leads risk dominates the one in which the high cost …rm leads.
By combining the Propositions 1 and 2 we, therefore, obtain our main result:
Theorem 1 The price leader equilibrium in which the e¢cient …rm leads and the ine¢cient …rm follows is the risk dominant equilibrium of the endogenous price commitment game.
Note that, if the costs of …rm 1 are not much higher than the costs of …rm 2, then F 1 > L 2 , i.e. the high cost …rm makes higher pro…ts (as a price follower) in the risk dominant equilibrium than the e¢cient …rm (as a price leader). This seems curious and counterintuitive at …rst sight since it could give incentives to the low cost …rm to increase its cost (if he would be able to do that in a credible way). However, given the cost structure, waiting is less risky for a high cost …rm than for a low cost …rm, and the ine¢cient …rm pro…ts from its "weak" position.
Risk Dominance in the Reduced Game
It is well known that risk dominance allows a very simple characterization for 2 £ 2 games with two Nash equilibria: the risk dominant equilibrium is that one for which the product of the deviation losses is largest. Consequently, if risk dominance could always be decided on the basis of the reduced game spanned by the two equilibria under consideration (and if the resulting relation would be transitive), then the solution could be found by straightforward computations. Unfortunately, this happy state of a¤airs does not prevail in general. The two concepts do not always generate the same solution and it is well-known that the Nash product of the deviation losses may be a bad description of the underlying risk situation in general. (See, Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) for a simple example.) This is also true for the game analyzed in this paper as the reduced game analysis produces exactly the opposite result from that obtained by applying the tracing procedure to the full game. The calculations are straightforward and can be found in the working paper version of this paper, Van Damme and Hurkens (2001) . We will here provide the intuition for why the reduced game describes the underlying risks so badly in the case of price competition with substitutable products.
Let us start by comparing how the bicentric priors are constructed in the full and the reduced game. Recall from the previous section that when …rm i is uncertain whether …rm j commits or waits, it is optimal for this …rm to commit to a price between the leader price and the follower price. The bicentric prior in the full game has therefore both …rms believing that the other will commit, although they are not sure to which price exactly. In the reduced game, however, committing to an intermediate price is not possible, and waiting becomes optimal when one expects the rival to commit with high probability. Consequently, the bicentric prior of the reduced game attaches positive weight to opponent j committing to p L j as well as to j waiting, with the e¢cient …rm being more likely to wait.
Given that the bicentric priors are qualitatively di¤erent in the two approaches, it is not surprising that the tracing procedure may map these priors into di¤erent equilibria.
Indeed, in the reduced game the best reply against the prior is for the e¢cient …rm to wait and for the ine¢cient …rm to commit and these actions remain optimal throughout the tracing procedure. Hence, the reduced game produces the equilibrium in which the ine¢cient …rm will lead. As we have seen above, the full game produces the opposite Stackelberg equilibrium.
It is worthwhile to point out that the di¤erence between the two approaches lies not only in the di¤erent bicentric priors. Even if we would construct the bicentric prior based on the full game, but again use the 2 £ 2 game to determine who will switch …rst and become the price leader, we will get the wrong result. If …rms can only commit to the leader price, the high cost …rm would switch …rst. However, …rms would switch earlier if they could use a safer strategy, like committing to the follower price. Given that opportunity, the low cost …rm will switch …rst and become the price leader. For further details we again refer the reader to the working paper version of this paper.
Conclusion
In this paper we studied the strategic choice of whether to lead or to follow in a duopoly price competition game with symmetrically horizontally di¤erentiated products and where the …rms di¤er in their marginal costs. We analysed a model in which …rms can decide to move early or late and, by using the risk dominance criterion, we were able to show that the e¢cient …rm will act as a price leader and that the ine¢cient …rm will occupy the more preferred role. Note that this does not necessarily imply that the largest …rm will lead. The e¢cient …rm has the largest market share if and only if he charges the lowest price and whether this holds depends on the extent to which the costs di¤er. If the cost di¤erence is small the e¢cient leader will have the higher price (hence the smaller market share) and if the di¤erence is large it will have the lowest price (and the larger market share). So our results are in line with the empirical observation that the price leader is often, but not always, the larger …rm. 5 As compared to the alternative candidate solution, where the least e¢cient …rm leads, the total pro…ts in the risk dominant equilibrium are higher (since L 2 + F 1 > L 1 + F 2 ), the division of the pro…ts is more equal ( jL 1 ¡ F 2 j < jL 2 ¡ F 1 j ) and consumer surplus is lower. To see why the latter holds, consider …rst the case where p L
one sees that when we go from S 2 to S 1 , the price decrease of good 2 is larger than the price increase of good 1. Since consumers buy more of good 2 than of good 1, this means that the bundle consumed under S 2 can be bought under S 1 for less money, which of course implies that consumers are better o¤ when …rm 1 is the leader. The argument for the other case where p L 1 > p L 2 > p F 1 > p F 2 is similar. First note that the goods are completely symmetric so that consumers are indi¤erent between the situation of S 2 and the situation in which …rm 1 charges p L 2 and …rm 2 charges p F 1 . If we compare the latter situation with S 1 we see that, since p F 1 ¡ p F 2 > p L 1 ¡ p L 2 , the price decrease of good 2 is larger than the price increase of good 1 so that again consumers prefer …rm 1 to lead.
The conclusion that the e¢cient …rm will move …rst appears to be robust. In our companion paper (Van Damme and Hurkens, 1999) we derive it for the case of quantity competition, Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) obtained it for the case of capacity-constrained price competition and homogeneous goods, and Cabrales et al. (2000) derived the result for the case of vertical product di¤erentiation, where …rms …rst choose qualities and next compete in prices. This latter paper also makes use of the concept of risk dominance, but it does not derive the result analytically; instead the authors resort to numerical computations and simulations. To our knowledge, the present paper, together with its companion on quantity competition, are the …rst applications of the (linear) tracing procedure to games where the strategy spaces are not …nite. We have seen that, although there may be some computational complexities, no new conceptual di¢culties are encountered. Of course, more important than this methodological aspect is the apparant robustness result itself, which might provide the theoretical underpinning for the observed phenomenon in practise that frequently the dominant …rm indeed acts as the leader (Scherer and Ross, 1990) .
Note that we did not provide the solution of the endogenous timing game for the case where both …rms have the same marginal costs. The reader might conjecture that in that case the Bertrand equilibrium would be selected, i.e. that …rms would move simultaneously, and indeed that is correct. Clearly, if the …rms are completely symmetric, none of the price leader equilibria can risk dominate the other as the solution of a symmetric game has to be symmetric. Similarly, none of the asymmetric mixed strategy equilibria can be the solution and since there are no symmetric mixed equilibria (as shown in Sect.
2), the solution has to be the Bertrand equilibrium. However, providing a formal direct proof is di¢cult. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) show that in the symmetric case the solution of the game is the linear trace of the barycentric prior 1 2 p L i + 1 2 w i ; provided the linear tracing procedure is well-de…ned. In Appendix A4, however, we show that the linear trace of this prior cannot be the Bertrand equilibrium. The intuition that we do not end up at the Bertrand equilibrium is simple: if the tracing path would converge there, then each player would have an incentive to wait (because each …rm would expect the other to commit to a random price) and that cannot be an equilibrium. It follows that the linear tracing procedure cannot be well-de…ned in this case and that the logarithmic tracing procedure has to be used.
We conclude by noting that the main result of this paper does not depend on the assumption that there are only two points in time when the prices can potentially be chosen. Assume that the market opens at time t = 0, but that …rms could …x their price at any time point t = 0; ¡1; ¡2; :::; ¡T , with players being committed to a price once it has been chosen and with players being fully informed about the past history. 6 The solution may be determined by backwards induction, i.e. by applying the subgame consistency principle from Harsanyi and Selten (1988) . It is common knowledge that, once the game reaches time t = ¡1 with no commitments being made, the e¢cient …rm will commit to p L 2 while the high cost …rm will wait. Knowing this, at t < ¡1, both players …nd it in their interest to wait. The predicted outcome, hence, is not sensitive to the number of commitment periods: both …rms will make their price announcements only shortly before the market opens, with the e¢cient …rm making the announcement slightly earlier.
The …rst factor within the integral is positive. It su¢ces to show that the second factor is also nonnegative. Well, the second factor is equal to zero for z = 0 and for z = 1.
The result follows once we have shown that the second factor is a concave function of z. The …rst derivative of the second factor (with respect to z) is
and the second derivative is
We prove the three inequalities in (4.2).
(i) g 2 (t; ¹ 1 ; º 1 ) > g 2 (t; ¹ 2 ; º 1 ).
Proof. Given expectations m t = (t; ¹; º), the optimal commitment price,p i (t) can be easily computed. The computations are almost identical to the derivation of p j (z) in If ¹ < p L j then b i (¹) < p F i < p L i and it follows thatp i (t)¸b i (¹). Using the theorem of the maximum, one now easily veri…es that @g i (m t ) @¹ = a(1 ¡ t)(p i (t) ¡ b i (¹))¸0: (A.2)
Since p L 1 > ¹ 1 > ¹ 2 we have thatp 2 (t)¸b 2 (¹ 1 )¸b 2 (¹ 2 ). It follows from (A.2) that g 2 (t; ¹ 1 ; º 1 ) > g 2 (t; ¹ 2 ; º 1 ):
¤ (ii) g 2 (t; ¹ 2 ; º 1 ) > g 2 (t; ¹ 2 ; º 2 ).
Proof. Again using the theorem of the maximum, one …nds @g i (m t ) @º = ¡(1 ¡ t)a 2 =4 < 0: (A.3)
Since º 1 < º 2 , it follows from (A.3) that g 2 (t; ¹ 2 ; º 1 ) > g 2 (t; ¹ 2 ; º 2 ):
¤ (iii) g 2 (t; ¹ 2 ; º 2 ) > g 1 (t; ¹ 2 ; º 2 ).
Proof. @g i (t; ¹; º) @c i = ¡(1 ¡ t)(1 ¡p i (t) + a¹) ¡ t(1 ¡p i (t) + a(1 + ap i (t) + c j )=2)
Taking the derivative of the right-hand side with respect to t yields d dt µ @g i @c i ¶ = (1 ¡ a 2 t=2)p 0 (t) + a¹ ¡ 1 + c i ¡ a(1 + ap i (t) + c j ) 2 ¡ @N i @c i = a(¡16 + 8a 2 ¡ 2a 3 ¡ 2a 4 + 2a 3 c i ¡ a 5 c i ¡ a 4 c j ) 4(4 ¡ a 2 ) 2 < 0
Hence, @g i @c i (t; ¹; º) · @ g i @c i (0; ¹; º) = 0:
The gain of committing for player i is decreasing in c i and increasing in c j . Hence, g 2 (m 2 jc 1 ; c 2 )¸g 2 (m 2 jc 2 ; c 1 ) = g 1 (m 2 jc 1 ; c 2 ) = g 1 (m 2 ):
¤

A4
We show that when …rms have identical costs the linear trace of the barycentric prior is not the pure equilibrium in which …rms commit themselves to the Bertrand equilibrium.
Let m = 1 2 p L + 1 2 w be the barycentric prior. Suppose that for t su¢ciently close to 1 the equilibrium of g t;m is x(t) = (1 ¡ w(t))p(t) + w(t)w, i.e. each …rm waits with probability w(t) and commits with probability (1 ¡ w(t)) to p(t). Hence, at t players' expectations are given by m t = (1 ¡ t)m + tx(t). Consider the derivative with respect to t of the gain function g(m t ). Because of the envelope theorem the e¤ect of the (optimal) commitment price cancels out and we obtain d dt g(m t ) = @g(m t ) @t + @g(m t ) @w w 0 (t) = (p(t) ¡ c)a ½ ¡ 1 2 p L ¡ 1 2 1 + ap(t) + c 2 + (1 ¡ w(t))p(t) + w(t) 1 + ap(t) + c 2 +tw 0 (t)( 1 + ap(t) + c 2 ¡ p(t))
If at t = 1 we would have w(1) = 0 and p(1) = p N then
Since at t = 1 the gain to commit is zero, this means that …rms will strictly prefer to wait at t < 1. Hence, the outcome of the linear tracing procedure cannot be the Bertrand equilibrium. ¤
